Case Brief: Mason v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)

Ulfa Ismail

Mason v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2023] SCC 21

Key terms

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA): Since its commencement in 2002, IRPA has served as the main piece of federal legislation governing matters regarding Canadian immigration

Foreign national: Referring to an individual residing in a country in which they do not hold citizenship

Immigration Division, Immigration Refugee Board Canada: An administrative tribunal responsible for making decisions regarding immigration and refugee issues.

Background

Earl Mason and Seifeslam Dleiow, two foreign nationals, were deemed inadmissible to enter Canada in 2018 through an Immigration Division (ID) Decision. In 2012, Mason, a citizen of Saint Lucia, had allegedly used a firearm and injured two people at a bar fight in Surrey, British Columbia. In 2014, Mason was charged with two counts of attempted murder and two counts of discharging a firearm with the intent to wound or disfigure. By 2015 however, all charges laid against Mason were dropped due to delays in the court process.

On the other hand, Dleiow, a citizen of Libya, first entered Canada in 2012 using a study permit and later made a claim for refugee protection in 2015 after his study permit had expired. Whilst in Canada, Dleiow was accused of engaging in several acts of violence, some of which were towards intimate partners. Dleiow pled guilty to three charges, (1) being unlawfully in a dwelling house with intent to commit an indictable offense; (2) mischief under $5,000; and (3) uttering threats to cause death or bodily harm. Meanwhile, the remaining charges against him were dropped.

Neither Mason nor Dleiow’s alleged crimes were determined to be linked to terrorism.

Procedural Posture

The admissibility of Mason and Dleiow to Canada was to be determined by the Immigration Division (ID) under the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. Reports prepared by the Canadian Border Services Agency, which held that Mason and Dleiow were inadmissible to Canada, cited sections of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) to support their case. Specifically, section 34(1)(e) which states that “a permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds” for reasons including “engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada”. Given the criminal histories of both Mason and Dleiow, the ID was tasked with determining if the respective acts if violence would pose a danger in terms of security.

In the ID’s 2018 decision regarding Mason’s admissibility, they determined that section 34(1)(e) of the IRPA did not apply. Although the alleged acts of violence were serious in nature, the charges laid against Mason in 2014 do not fall into the categorization of a national security threat.

In 2019, the ID’s 2018 decision was appealed by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD). The IAD rejected the previous ruling by the ID and held that section 34(1)(e) did not require proof that Mason could pose a national security risk for Canada at large. Rather, this section could also protect individual Canadians from potential violence. Hence, Mason's alleged history of violence falls under section 34(1)(e) and deems him inadmissible to Canada.

The case Mr. Dleiow was brought to question under the ID in 2019, utilizing the IAD’s interpretation of section 34(1)(e) in Mason’s case, which determined that a link to Canadian national security was not necessary to deem a person as inadmissible. Thus, Dleiow’s violent criminal record deemed him inadmissible and a subsequent deportation order was made.

The Federal Court of Appeal

After the Immigration Appeal Division's decision, Mason and Dleiow brought their case to the Federal Court of Canada. The federal courts disagreed with the IAD’s previous ruling and held that section 34(1)(e) required that there be a link between alleged crimes and national security.

Following this, Mason and Dlieows made appeals to the Federal Court of Appeal in 2019 and 2020 respectively. Ultimately, the Federal Court of Appeal agreed with the Immigration Board’s interpretation of section 34(1)(e) which did not require an individual to be considered a threat to national security to be enacted.

Supreme Court of Canada Holding and Reasoning

Following the rulings from the Federal Court of Appeal, Mason and Dleiow appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The majority, voiced by Justice Jamal, concluded that the appeals should be allowed given that the IAD’s decision did not fall in line with section 34(1)(e). The majority held that the accurate interpretation of section 34(1)(e) is that one must engage in act(s) of violence linked to national security or the security of Canada at large.

Both Mason and Dleiow’s appeals were allowed. The Federal Court of Appeal’s decision was set aside. For Mason, there was a restoration of the ID’s initial decision. For Dleiow’s appeal, the Supreme Court ordered that the ID’s decision be quashed as well as his deportation order.

Implications

Mason v. Canada demonstrated the issue of the various interpretations and subsequently, rulings, that can arise from section 34(1)(e) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. In this case, the Supreme Court establishes a specific interpretation in which an individual must be specifically categorized as a threat to national security as opposed to a potential threat to individual Canadians.

The establishment of a specific interpretation of section 34(1)(e) is important to administer justice in a way that is consistent and thus, increasingly fair. The initial administrative decision to deport Dleiow for example, is a reminder of the high-stakes nature of many cases administered by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada.

Likewise, there are many stakes involved for Canadians, whose security is sought to be protected through section 34 of the IRPA. Potential security threats, in this context, refer to threats to Canadians in a broader sense, as opposed to the more specific, personal or individual potential threats. For Canadians concerned over specific individuals who pose a potential threat that falls outside of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 34(1)(e), other legal means of protection may be exercised. With this, other legal and community-based means of protection must be well-developed and made accessible. This is especially critical in cases where Canadians personally face potential risk, such as that of intimate partner violence. In other words, while section 34(1)(e) addresses the admissibility of an individual, the security of Canadians must be viewed beyond the scope of this legislation.

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Bibliography

Supreme Court of Canada. 2023. “Mason v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) - SCC Cases.” Scc-Csc.ca. September 27, 2023. https://decisions.scc-csc.ca/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/20081/index.do.

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