the Dark Side of Secularism: Exclusion Disguised as Neutrality
- Dwija Bhatt

- Aug 3
- 10 min read
By Dwija Bhatt
Abstract
This paper critically examines Quebec’s Bill 21, a law that prohibits certain public employees from wearing visible religious symbols, and argues that it enforces a narrow, exclusionary interpretation of secularism that disproportionately targets religious minorities particularly Muslim women. While the law is framed as a measure to uphold state neutrality, it reveals how secularism can be invoked to justify systemic discrimination. Drawing from international jurisprudence, particularly the European Court of Human Rights, and contrasting it with Canada’s constitutional commitment to multiculturalism and religious freedom, the paper highlights the legal and social consequences of Bill 21. It explores the gendered and state-driven dimensions of Islamophobia embedded within the law, supported by the theoretical frameworks of Khaled Beydoun and the scholarship of Reem Bahdi and Azeezah Kanji. The paper also contextualizes the legislation within Quebec’s historical trajectory of secularism, including the failed Charter of Values. Ultimately, it argues that Bill 21 challenges Canada’s foundational values of inclusion and pluralism, raising urgent concerns about the limits of majority rule and the future of religious accommodation in a democratic society.
Introduction
In a country as diverse and multicultural as Canada, religion often forms a central part of individual and community identity particularly for immigrants, who collectively shape the nation’s identity. On June 16, 2019, Quebec's National Assembly passed the Act Respecting the Laicity of the State (commonly known as Bill 21), a law that prohibits certain public employees such as teachers, judges, and police officers from wearing visible religious symbols, including hijabs, kippahs, and turbans, while at work. It also mandates that public servants must carry out their duties with their faces uncovered and requires that citizens seeking public services do the same. While the government justifies the law as a measure to ensure state neutrality, critics argue that it infringes on fundamental rights, particularly the freedom of religion, and disproportionately affects religious minorities especially Muslim women who wear the hijab (Mégret 2022, 217). Although secularism, in principle, promotes equality, freedom of religion, and state neutrality, Bill 21 has sparked national debate over the true meaning of secularism and the limits of religious expression in a democratic society. Rooted in a long-standing debate in Quebec over multiculturalism and the accommodation of religious diversity, the law arguably enforces a narrow interpretation of secularism at the expense of inclusion and diversity (Mégret 2022, 218).The paper begins by situating Bill 21 within the broader legal and political context, before evaluating its alignment with international secularism standards. It then examines the law’s historical roots and explores its socio-cultural implications, particularly in relation to Islamophobia and its impact on religious minorities in Quebec. Finally, the paper concludes with an analysis of the law’s broader effects on social cohesion and its contribution to the marginalization of Muslim communities.
International level
The shift in legislation restricting religious symbols in public institutions reflects a broader global trend shaped by strict interpretations of secularism, particularly in countries like France and Turkey. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has consistently upheld such restrictions, reinforcing the prioritization of national secular policies over individual religious freedoms (Mégret 2020, 226). Following the adoption of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1950, which created a unified system for human rights protection (Morini 2010, 611), several landmark cases have affirmed state authority to limit religious expression. In Leyla Şahin v. Turkey (2005), the ECtHR ruled that banning headscarves in universities did not violate Article 9 on religious freedom. The applicant also alleged discrimination under Article 14, noting that Muslim men were not similarly restricted, but the court rejected this claim (Hughes 2017, 138). Similarly, in Dahlab v. Switzerland, the court upheld a ban on a teacher’s hijab, reasoning that it conveyed an implicit religious message, even in the absence of complaints (Adrian 2017, 176).Turkey's headscarf ban stems from its adoption of laiklik, a rigid, French-inspired secularism that evolved into “assertive secularism”a model where the state not only separates from religion but actively confines it to the private sphere to preserve public secularism (Topal 2011, 3–5). Under this model, religious symbols like the hijab were banned in public institutions. In contrast, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), which represents more conservative and religious populations, promoted a more accommodationist, “Anglo-Saxon” approach to secularism, which allows for religious expression in public life (Topal 2011, 2–5). Unlike Turkey and France, however, Canada’s constitutional framework emphasizes multiculturalism and stronger protections for religious freedoms, setting it apart from these assertively secular models.
Domestic level
Canada’s constitutional commitment to multiculturalism, enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, stands in stark contrast to Bill 21’s rigid secularism, which marks a significant departure from the country's tradition of religious accommodation (Mégret 2020, 234). Critics argue the law disproportionately affects Muslim women and other religious minorities by restricting employment opportunities for those who wear religious symbols. Organizations like Amnesty International and the Quebec Human Rights Commission have condemned the law for violating fundamental rights (Kirmayer 2019, 1120). The legislation also reinforces Islamophobic narratives that portray Muslim women as oppressed and in need of saving, a trope rooted in Western rhetoric that often justifies restrictions on religious expression under the guise of promoting gender equality and secularism (Berns-McGown et al 2021, 237). Rather than empowering women, Bill 21 forces them to choose between their faith and their careers. Heba, a Muslim woman who aspired to become a police officer, shared: “Sadly, I could not do what I love to do because of what I am wearing” ("Policing Dreams Halted by Bill 21"). Her story is one of many illustrating how the law marginalizes religious minorities, especially women, both socially and economically (Kirmayer 2019, 1131).
Despite its known conflict with the Charter, the Quebec government invoked Section 33, the notwithstanding clause, to shield Bill 21 from constitutional challenges (Meunier & Legault-Leclair 2021). This prompted legal action from groups such as the CCLA, NCCM, and Hak, who argued the law was discriminatory and imposed by the majority. The Quebec Court of Appeal reviewed the case in November 2019 but upheld the law in December due to the notwithstanding clause limiting judicial authority. After no success in lower courts, the case reached the Quebec Superior Court, which began hearings in November 2020. On April 20, 2021, the court ruled that the bill would not apply to English-language school boards, protected under Section 23 of the Charter, which is immune to the notwithstanding clause (Mamlok 2024, 58 ; CBC News 2019). It also struck down the requirement for uncovered faces in public services. Still, the bulk of the law remains, leaving many feeling excluded and reinforcing systemic barriers and contributing to rising Islamophobia in Quebec.
Bill 21 and Islamophobia
This part of the paper shows how Bill 21 is Islamophobic in both its design and impact, as it aligns with and perpetuates the key dimensions of Islamophobia outlined in the article written by Reem Bahdi and Azeezah Kanji on gendered Islamophobia, impact-based discrimination, state-driven Islamophobia, and the reinforcement of negative stereotypes. Before diving deep into the various types of Islamophobia, let us see the history of Islamophobia. The term Islamophobia was popularized in 1985 by Edward Said to describe its appearance in popular, political, legal, and popular lexicons (Bahdi and Kanji 2018, 321). The Ontario Human Rights Commission defines Islamophobia as "stereotypes, bias or acts of hostility directed towards Muslim individuals or institutions" (Bahdi and Kanji 2018, 325). However, Khaled Beydoun critiques definitions centred on an "irrational fear" of Islam and Muslims, arguing that this approach "privatizes this form of racism and moves attention away from the systemic targeting and discrimination against Muslims by the state" (Bahdi and Kanji 2018, 323). Khaled Beydoun suggests that defining Islamophobia as an "irrational fear" is insufficient. Instead, his analysis focuses on systemic discrimination against Muslims by the state. He posits that Islamophobia is "perpetuated by private actors; is motivated; is historically rooted in Orientalism; draws on and perpetuates stereotypes about a Muslim propensity for violence; draws on and perpetuates gender stereotypes about roles and the nature of Muslim women; is state-driven; and, persists through a dialectical process of private and state action" (Bahdi and Kanji 2018, 323). He later emphasizes the presumption that "Islam is inherently violent, alien, and unassimilable," which correlates with a "propensity for terrorism" and is "rooted in understandings of Islam as a civilization's antithesis and perpetuated by government structures and private citizens" (Bahdi and Kanji 2018, 328).
Gendered Islamophobia is particularly salient in this context. The article highlights that Muslim women who wear visible religious symbols, such as the hijab, face disproportionate levels of discrimination and scrutiny (Bahdi and Kanji 2018, 335). Bill 21, which prohibits public sector employees in positions of authority from wearing religious symbols, disproportionately affects these women by effectively excluding them from specific professional opportunities. This is not a neutral policy but one that structurally disadvantages individuals based on both their gender and religious identity. The article also discusses impact-based definitions of Islamophobia and further supports this analysis. Rather than focusing solely on intent, impact-based frameworks assess how policies disadvantage Muslim individuals in their everyday lives (Bahdi and Kanji 2018, 327). Bill 21, by barring visibly Muslim individuals from full participation in the public workforce, reproduces inequality and exclusion in ways that align with this understanding of Islamophobia.
Lastly, the article addresses state-driven Islamophobia wherein government policies and institutional practices contribute to or reflect anti-Muslim sentiment (Bahdi and Kanji 2018, 336). Although Bill 21 is framed under the rhetoric of secularism, its disproportionate impact on Muslim communities, particularly women, reveals how state mechanisms can perpetuate Islamophobia under the guise of neutrality. Lastly, by implying that religious symbols, especially those associated with Islam, are incompatible with the values or professionalism required in public service, Bill 21 reinforces harmful stereotypes. It contributes to a broader climate of suspicion and marginalization. Bill 21 exemplifies how Islamophobia can be embedded in state policy and legitimized through seemingly neutral legal frameworks, with particularly harmful consequences for Muslim women.
Quebec’s history with secularism
Talal Asad (2003) argues that secularism is not just about separating religion from the public sphere. It is also about controlling and regulating it. Bill 21 exemplifies this paradox. While it claims to uphold neutrality, it actively intervenes in religious expression, determining which identities are deemed acceptable in public institutions and which are not. This selective application of secularism reinforces existing power structures and stipulates that the majority have the right to control the way minorities live. By restricting the wearing of religious symbols in public service, the law normalizes certain expressions of identity while rendering others incompatible with Quebec's institutions. Unfortunately, this dynamic is not new; Quebec's history is filled with examples of policies that claim to uphold secularism but ultimately aim to marginalize specific groups, for example, Bill 60 (Kirmayer 2019, 1120). The paradoxical nature of Bill 21's application of secularism underscores the need for a more nuanced understanding of the law and its implications. This is not the first time that such a bill has been presented. Ten years ago, a similar bill was introduced. One of the most well-known religious controversies in recent Canadian history is Quebec's Charter of Values. This Charter, also known as Bill 60, was proposed in September 2013 and would have banned public employees from wearing "ostentatious religious symbols'' to work or having their faces covered. While the provincial government argued that the Charter was designed to promote secularism, opponents of the bill responded that it infringed on religious liberties guaranteed by the Charter of Rights and Freedom. In 2014, the Parti Quebecois who proposed the bill lost their provincial election, and the Charter was never passed. The justification that the provincial government used for Bill 60 was that according to the logic of laïcité or secularism, wearing religious symbols in public institutions undermines the neutrality of the state. By demonstrating their religious affiliation to the public, government workers suggest that they are judging not solely on the law but also on their religious convictions -something which led to oppression in Quebec's past (Canadian law and religion: The Québec Charter of Values). This same justification is used today to pass Bill 21. Amnesty International and the Quebec Human Rights Commission condemned Bill 60 as a clear violation of existing human rights legislation and the Charter (Kirmayer 2019, 1119).
Conclusion
At the end Bill 21 presents a profound challenge to Canada’s foundational principles of multiculturalism, equality, and religious freedom. While framed as a commitment to state neutrality, the law in practice disproportionately targets religious minorities, particularly Muslim women, undermining their ability to participate fully in public life. As seen above Bill 21 is not an isolated phenomenon but part of a broader international trend where secularism is used to justify restrictions on religious expression. However, unlike countries such as France or Turkey, Canada’s constitutional framework is built on pluralism and accommodation, making the adoption of such exclusionary policies a troubling departure. The law exemplifies gendered and state-driven Islamophobia and deepening social divisions under the guise of neutrality. Quebec’s historical trajectory of secularism, as seen in the failed Charter of Values, reveals that these efforts to regulate religious expression are not new but part of a longstanding pattern of controlling minority identities. Bill 21 thus serves as a cautionary example of how secularism is used to justify discrimination, raising urgent questions about the limits of majority rule and the future of inclusion in Canadian society. To uphold the values it claims to represent, Canada must critically re-examine such legislation.
Citations
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